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The Economics of Plant Closure
Some Research Questions
The economist offers a simple answer to the question of why a par 
ticular plant closed it was no longer profitable. A slightly more com 
plex version is that the profitability of the plant fell below a minimal 
threshold level for the company so that an alternative investment of the 
capital embodied in the plant was preferable to continued operation. 
Such economic explanations are helpful in focusing on the problem, 
but they do not begin to answer the next question why is the plant no 
longer profitable? Why is the plant "uncompetitive"? Why has it not 
been "modernized"? Why are labor or other factor costs higher than 
elsewhere, or why did demand fall? These questions require an institu 
tional examination of the ceterus considered by economic theory to be 
paribus.
In particular, this study focuses on the labor factor and its relative 
importance in decisions to close plants. Other factors cannot be ignored 
and there is no intention in this study of sweeping them under the rug 
or suggesting that if all the labor factor issues could be resolved, plants 
would go on forever. Such a conclusion is simply not true. The labor 
factor has been identified as a key element in the competitiveness of 
particular areas, however, so it is fair to attempt an evaluation of the 
role of that factor despite a recognition that other factors affecting the 
viability of a particular plant may overwhelm the labor element.
Response to Change
Among the factors economists identify as contributors to a plant©s 
decline is its inability to respond to external changes in product and 
factor markets or to internal opportunities for technological advancement.
Short-Run Changes in the Product Market
The simplest example of a need for change may be the case where 
new competitors erode the monopoly power of particular producers and
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force a decline in market price. To the extent that employees have shared 
in the monopoly rents (profits) with their employer, there will necessarily 
be a downward adjustment in labor costs, either through a more effi 
cient utilization of labor or direct reduction of wages and benefits, if 
the plant is to survive. "Concession bargaining" demonstrates that 
downward adjustments are sometimes made. Such negotiations are 
always difficult, in part, for reasons outlined in figure 1.1. The following 
paragraph numbers correspond to the numbers in the Plant Closing 
Negotiation Model.
1. Two kinds of employer motivation give rise to the possibility of 
plant closing negotiations. A bonafide (1A) motivation is one where 
the employer actually considers closing for reasons which may or may 
not be related to the labor climate. Alternatively, an employer may use 
the threat of plant closing as a bluff (IB) in an effort to gain bargaining 
leverage.
To the external observer, including union leaders, distinguishing be 
tween these two motivations may be difficult. Many employees believ 
ed during the recession of the early 1980s that their company was tak 
ing advantage of the economic times. With other plants closing, however, 
any threat had to be taken seriously. 1 The appropriate response is ob 
viously different in the two situations. A wrong conclusion for exam 
ple, that (IB) exists when in fact (1A) is the case may be fatal. How 
do unions distinguish? Are they now aware of mistakes they have made 
in the past?
2. Given that an employer has a bonafide motivation, it may pro 
ceed with an analysis of its operations, make a firm decision to close 
its facilities, and then announce this decision to its employees and their 
union (2A); or the employer may raise the matter for discussion with 
its employees, perhaps by suggesting areas where labor cost considera 
tions have a bearing on its closing decision (2B). When does an employer 
initiate such discussions? Why? Under what circumstances does the 
employer simply make the decision with no attempt to adjust labor cost 
factors through discussions with the union?
2.1. The Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) have issued a number of decisions concern 
ing the employer©s legal obligation to negotiate when a decision is made 
to subcontract, close down facilities completely, or partially shut down 
facilities. In First National Maintenance2 , The Supreme Court deter 
mined that a firm was obligated to negotiate the impact or effect of its
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Figure 1 
Plant Closing Negotiations Model
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decision to reduce its operations, but not to negotiate with respect to 
the actual decision. In 1981, the International Union of Electrical 
Workers sued Singer for closing a plant in Newark, New Jersey. Pan 
try Pride was also sued by its unions in Baltimore after the company 
closed a number of stores. 3 Does a legal requirement to negotiate, or 
the threat of legal action, enhance the likelihood of success in saving jobs?
2.2. When an employer has had difficult labor-management relations 
and has generally faced a union the employer feels is recalcitrant and 
uncompromising, does that employer seek to avoid any contact with 
the union and thus minimize the unpleasantness that is involved in the 
plant closing decision? The employer may expect that the longer the 
union is kept ignorant, the less harm the union can create. In short, 
what, if anything, motivates an employer to conceal a plant closure 
decision?
2.3. The employer who raises the issue of possible plant closing for 
discussion may do so out of a hope that concessions might be made 
or out of a loyalty to long-term employees and a concern for their well- 
being. What motivates an employer to raise the matter of plant closing 
is a critical question, because unless the employer raises the issue in 
a timely manner and offers to discuss it, there is a reduced likelihood 
that anything can be done to save the plant.
3. When an employer makes a unilateral decision to close, union 
leaders may not respond at all (3A); they may respond by initiating law 
suits or other third party political action designed to forestall the clos 
ing (3B); or they may request that the company reconsider its decision 
and offer to discuss some of the labor cost aspects associated with it 
(3C). The 3B and 3C responses may of course be combined where union 
leaders are merely using the 3B response to gain leverage in the 3C 
negotiations. Why is there no union response sometimes? Is it a lack 
of interest or expertise to deal with the issues? Do leaders view the situa 
tion as a lost cause? Do general labor market conditions affect their 
response? How do leaders decide between 3B or 3C when they take 
action? Is 3C the response most likely to yield success to keep the 
plant open indefinitely? If it is, how can union leaders be encouraged 
to take that alternative? What prevents their taking that approach?
4. Union response to an employer-initiated discussion is likely to be 
motivated by the same considerations as a response to a unilateral 
employer decision to close. Research questions 3 and 4 are, therefore, 
closely related though not identical.
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When an employer initiates a discussion of labor costs, union leader 
reaction may be favorable so that negotiations are undertaken (4A), or 
negative so that no discussions are undertaken (4B). The employer in 
itiative might also be treated in a perfunctory way so that no real negotia 
tions occur. Union leaders may take a negative position on reopening 
negotiations for strategic reasons related to the union©s position in other 
bargaining units. For example, a refusal to meet might be motivated 
by concern for the pattern-setting effect any concessions might have. 
How important is this motive as a bar to negotiations on labor cost 
factors?
5. Perhaps the most important question in this study is what 
distinguishes successful (5A) from unsuccessful (5B) negotiations, once 
the parties are at the table. Successful negotiations are, of course, defined 
as those which maintain the plant. 4 When talks fail, is there generally 
a miscalculation on the part of the union concerning employer motiva 
tion (1A versus IB)? That is, does the union conclude that the employer 
is bluffing when it is not? What other factors contribute to the failure 
of talks? What are the factors which lead to successful talks? Is it ex 
pertise and knowledge on the part of union negotiators concerning the 
economics of the situation the plant faces? When do employers or unions 
take a hard line in negotiations? Are their positions solely dependent 
on economic factors, or are leadership styles, personality variables, or 
other "nonrational" issues important to the outcome?
6. Where a union refuses to negotiate after a request from the employer 
(4B), either the employer closes the plant (6A) or the plant remains 
open (6B). When the latter happens, is it always safe to assume the 
employer was bluffing?
7. Finally, with respect to figure 1.1, is there a distinction between 
plants which remain open indefinitely (7A) and those which subsequently 
close anyway (7B), even though substantial labor cost concessions have 
been granted? Is it true that once concessions are requested it is usually 
too late to save the plant? Many union negotiators are not convinced 
that concessions save plants. 5
Long-Run Changes—a "Tragedy Scenario"6
One model for an Elizabethan tragedy calls for the introduction of 
the hero©s dilemma in the first and second acts, a set of events leading 
to a climax (the "handwriting on the wall") in the third act, and the 
playing out of the inevitable tragic conclusion in the fourth and fifth
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acts. Even though this model may reflect poetic license, and not a very 
good fit with the actual plays of Shakespeare, it does describe a pattern 
that applies to some production facilities in Cleveland.
Perhaps as long as 30 years before a particular plant is closed, cor 
porate planners are called upon to expand facilities for increased out 
put or new product lines. At that point in time, a decision is made to 
begin operations at an altogether new location. A variety of reasons 
is given for choosing a new location rather than expanding at the ex 
isting plant. Typically, they include availability of space at much lower 
cost, proximity to new or expanding markets or to suppliers, and occa 
sionally matters related to labor and human resources. Avoidance of 
a militant union might be a factor, but this is often offset by the lack 
of a trained or trainable labor force, particularly in industries where 
there is special reliance on experienced or skilled workers.
Though it was not intended and never recognized as such, the deci 
sion to expand production in an entirely new location may be the climax 
of Act III. It is not part of a conscious 25-30 year long-term policy to 
relocate the corporation to the Sun Belt, but it is the decision that deter 
mines the eventual fate of the older original plant location. Once a plant 
is established in a new location, expansion of that facility is often easier 
than at the old location because planners have anticipated such needs 
and purchased extra land in the initial new construction. After several 
years, productivity and labor costs in the new plant are more favorable 
than in the old plant because the newer plant was built and equipped 
with the latest technology. As one union interviewee on this project 
noted, "If they gave us the equipment those guys down South have, 
we could make [product] twice as good as they do and twice as fast! 
With the junk we have to work with it©s a wonder we get anything out 
of this plant."
When the inevitable recession occurs, production cutbacks are or 
dinarily scheduled for plants with the highest costs and lowest rates of 
productivity. If production is permanently reduced, "consolidation" 
or "rationalization" of production is concentrated into the more pro 
ductive plants. Over a period of years, with successive expansions and 
contractions, the inevitable decision is made to close the old site com 
pletely. The only way to reverse such a process is via a new decision, 
sometime prior to the ultimate phase-out, to introduce new products 
or technology into the old plant. Such a decision can be made only when 
relative cost advantages dictate it.
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Need for continuous change. In the long run, all markets change. Con 
sumer tastes, customer needs, factor markets, and technological changes 
combine to assure that practically no product has an infinite life. In many 
plants, the products produced and the technology in use change, thus 
extending the life of the plant. In some plants, they do not. In view 
of limited product life cycles, change is the sine qua non for remaining 
viable. Part of the explanation for differences among plants is the percep 
tion on the part of management concerning the ease with which change 
could be introduced. A labor force that is thought to be rigid or unwill 
ing to accept change would clearly stand as a "cost" in the evaluation 
of whether change should be introduced. Such a cost is just as surely 
an element in plant closing as "excessive wages." In fact, it may be 
a more serious issue because its effects are insidious and irreversible 
after some crucial point.
In this study, an attempt has been made to evaluate the relative im 
portance of "labor force rigidity" as a factor contributing to the failure 
to introduce timely investment that could preserve plants and jobs. The 
research question is to what extent employee or union rigidity inhibits 
or eliminates the flexibility that is necessary to sustain a plant. An 
ticipating some of the study©s findings, this question has been expand 
ed to look into the extent to which unions actually seek or pursue change 
in product mix or technology in an effort to assure job security.
Greenfields closer to home. A good strategy for averting the tragedy 
scenario altogether was demonstrated in two cases reported in chapter 
4. Instead of relocating a new facility to an altogether different area 
of the country, new "greenfield" plants were built in close proximity 
(easy commuting distance) to the existing plant. New technologies and 
the scope of the expansion projects demanded new plants, but contrary 
to the usual tragedy scenario, these plants were built nearby, despite 
the fact that more distant locations were seriously considered by manage 
ment. Union leaders were called upon to make contract modifications 
to accommodate the new plants, not only with respect to the conditions 
and benefits of the yet-to-be-hired employees, but also for existing 
employees.
Why do some union leaders comprehend the importance of plant loca 
tion decisions and make the effort to influence them? When does manage 
ment recognize the possibility of improving its overall relationship with 
the union and take the risk of negotiating a matter that is clearly beyond 
the purview of the NLRA©s mandatory scope of bargaining? What fac 
tors contribute to the successful conclusion of such negotiations?
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Personalities and "Politics"
Rank-and-file resistance and union politics have also been cited as 
a key factor in determining the success of negotiations when employers 
ask for concessions. Such considerations may determine whether path 
4A or 4B is followed in figure 1.1. Thomas Miner, vice-president of 
labor relations for Chrysler was quoted recently on this. "Industry©s 
problems at the bargaining table are not now with union leadership, 
but with the rank-and-file." 7
The leadership on both sides of the labor-management relationship 
appears to play crucial roles in determining whether particular plants 
survive. Even leaders with Messianic traits cannot step into a situation 
that lacks economic viability and save it. As noted above, this study 
is not about such situations. Rather, this research question concerns plants 
that appear to be economically viable, but ineffective leadership causes 
premature closure. More broadly, the research question relates to the 
importance of leadership and other noneconomic elements in determining 
whether plants close prematurely. Why is it that union members vote 
to reject concessions despite the fact that job loss will follow? Why does 
such behavior, which appears irrational from an economic standpoint, 
occur?
Summary
An underlying premise in this study has been that plants that have 
lost their economic viability will be closed. No heroic effort will save 
them. Many plants close prematurely, however. The most visible situa 
tion involving premature closure is one where relatively short-run 
changes in product market competition erode the monopoly rents of an 
employer and require the downward adjustment of wages. Convincing 
a union, and more important its constituents, that such adjustments are 
necessary, is the crucial step in saving a plant in this situation. How 
does that process work?
Cases where longer term change has not been accommodated are less 
visible. That is, the closure seems inevitable when it occurs, but to those 
who review the situation carefully, it is evident that actions could have 
been taken to extend the life of the plant had they been undertaken ear 
ly enough. New products and investment in new processes are crucial 
throughout a plant©s life. The key question here is why such actions 
were not taken in a timely fashion.
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Finally, noneconomic contributing elements cannot be dismissed. How 
important are they in situations where potentially viable plants fail? Are 
there systematic explanations for the failure of interpersonal or political 
relationships?
The following chapters provide case examples that illustrate some 
of the issues raised in this chapter. They provide partial and tentative 
answers for some of the questions. Some readers will disagree with the 
conclusions reported here. It is hoped that they will be inspired to offer 
their own conclusions or, better still, engage in their own research to 
better address the issues involved.
The usual caveat regarding the usefulness of case studies must be 
entered. They raise more questions than they answer in any definitive 
way.
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